threat-modeling

Threat Modeling

Role: worker. This command performs STRIDE analysis directly and documents threats/mitigations — it does not implement the mitigations it identifies.

Overview

Structured security analysis for identifying threats, attack surfaces, and mitigations during design or review phases. Ensures security considerations are addressed before implementation, not after.

Constraints

• Focus on trust boundaries, not implementation details
• Every mitigation must map to a verifiable test or verification method
• Document accepted risks explicitly with rationale; do not silently ignore threats
• Revisit the threat model when architecture, authentication, or data flows change

Core Concepts

STRIDE Classification

Category	Definition	Example Threats
Spoofing	Pretending to be something or someone else	Forged authentication tokens, impersonated services
Tampering	Modifying data or code without authorization	Altered request payloads, modified configuration files
Repudiation	Denying an action was performed	Unlogged administrative actions, unsigned transactions
Information Disclosure	Exposing data to unauthorized parties	Leaked credentials in logs, verbose error messages
Denial of Service	Making a system unavailable	Resource exhaustion, unbounded queries
Elevation of Privilege	Gaining access beyond authorization	Broken access control, privilege escalation via injection

Trust Boundaries

Points where data crosses privilege levels. Every trust boundary is a potential attack surface. Common boundaries:

• Client to server
• Service to service (internal)
• Application to database
• System to external dependency
• User role transitions

Attack Surface

Entry points exposed to untrusted input: API endpoints, file uploads, message queues, configuration inputs, user-supplied queries. Smaller attack surface means fewer threats to mitigate.

Patterns

Threat Identification Procedure

1. Enumerate assets — identify what needs protection (data, services, credentials, infrastructure)
2. Draw trust boundaries — map where data crosses privilege levels
3. Identify entry points — list all inputs exposed to untrusted sources
4. Classify threats per STRIDE — for each entry point, apply each STRIDE category and document applicable threats
5. Rate severity — assess impact (critical/high/medium/low) and likelihood for each threat

Mitigation Mapping

Threat Category	Standard Mitigations	Verification Method
Spoofing	Authentication, mutual TLS, token validation	Auth integration tests, certificate verification
Tampering	Input validation, integrity checks, signed payloads	Tampering test cases, checksum validation
Repudiation	Audit logging, event sourcing, digital signatures	Log completeness review, signature verification
Information Disclosure	Encryption at rest/in transit, access controls, log scrubbing	Security scan, log audit, access control tests
Denial of Service	Rate limiting, resource quotas, circuit breakers	Load tests, resource monitoring
Elevation of Privilege	Least privilege, role-based access, input sanitization	Authorization test matrix, penetration tests

Threat Model Review Triggers

Revisit the threat model when any of the following occur:

• New external dependency added
• New API endpoint or entry point exposed
• Authentication or authorization changes
• Data flow changes crossing trust boundaries
• Infrastructure topology changes

When to Apply

Scenario	Apply?
New service or API endpoint	Yes
New external integration	Yes
Authentication or authorization changes	Yes
Data flow crossing trust boundaries	Yes
Internal refactoring with no boundary changes	No
UI-only cosmetic changes	No

Guidelines

1. Focus on trust boundaries, not implementation details. Threats exist at boundaries where privilege levels change.
2. Mitigations must be verifiable. Every mitigation maps to a test or verification method; unverifiable mitigations are theater.
3. Document accepted risks explicitly. When a threat is acknowledged but not mitigated, record the rationale, severity, and conditions for revisiting.
4. Review when architecture changes. The threat model is a living document that stays current with the system it describes.
5. Severity drives priority. Critical and high-severity threats block implementation; medium and low are tracked and scheduled.
6. Threat models are collaborative. Security analysis improves with input from architects, developers, and operations engineers.

Output

STRIDE threat table with severity ratings, mitigation mapping, and verification methods. Explicitly list accepted risks with rationale. Be concise — table format; group by STRIDE category.

Integration

• Agent-Assisted Specification — invoke during the Architecture Specification stage to identify security constraints before implementation
• Governance & Compliance — threat documentation feeds compliance audit trails and security review records
• Accuracy Validation — verify threat assessments against actual system state, not assumed state